Supreme Court, U. S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-1720

ROXANNE DOVE, LUCY MAE PINKSTON, BARBARA PETRE and VONNIE JOE JOHNSON,

Appellants,

vs.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No.

CONNIE SUE BAYSINGER, ET AL.,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal by Appellants Roxanne Dove, Lucy Mae Pinkston, Barbara Petre and Vonnie Joe Johnson from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana entered on December 3, 1979, which upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana Public Indecency statute, Indiana Code 35-45-4-1 (1978 ed.) thus reversing a trial court judgment that the statute violated the Constitution of the United States for the reason that it was vague and overbroad.

In the Court below, 11 cases dealing with similar issues emanating out of Allen County, Indiana Superior Court were consolidated for purposes of appeal. The Appellants (Appellees below) Dove, Pinkston, Petre and Johnson were represented below by counsel of record in this cause. Connie Sue Baysinger,

Barbara Dean Fuhr, Linda Louise Graber, Victoria Sue Theobald, Nedra Marie Thompson, Genise Arlene Tumbleston, Sandra Sue Walker, were also Appellees below. They were not represented by any counsel in the Court below and no briefs were filed in their behalf. This appeal ostensibly is on behalf of Dove, Pinkston, Petre and Johnson. Because the case below was entitled *State of Indiana* v. *Connie Sue Baysinger, et al.* and because counsel of record believes that United States Supreme Court Rule 10(4) makes all 11 Appellees below parties to this appeal, this appeal is being docketed as *Connie Sue Baysinger, et al.* v. *State of Indiana.*

THE OPINIONS BELOW

The Superior Court of Allen County, Indiana dismissed without opinion the charges of violation of the Indiana Public Indecency statute, Ind. Code 35-45-4-1 that had been filed against Appellants. The dismissal was made by an Order Book entry, there was no written judgment as such.

The opinion of the three Justice majority of the Indiana Supreme Court is reported at ..... Ind. ....., 397 N. E. 2d 580, and is reprinted as Appendix B of this statement. Also found in Appendix B are two dissenting opinions issued by members of the Indiana Supreme Court. The order of the Indiana Supreme Court denying Appellants' Petition for Rehearing is reprinted as Appendix A of this statement.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutionality of Indiana Code, Section 35-45-4-1 (a)(3) and (b) is involved here. The full text of that statute is as follows:

> 35-45-4-1. Public Indecency.—(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
>
> (1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
>
> (2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;

(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or

(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.

(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. [I.C. 35-45-4-1, as added by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 5, P. 718; 1977, P.L. 340, § 76, P. 1533]

A class A misdemeanor in Indiana carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for a fixed term of not more than one year to which in addition may be added a fine of not more than $5,000.00. *Indiana Code* 35-50-3-2 (1978 ed.).

Indiana Code, Section 35-3.1-1-4(e) provides:

"The order of dismissal shall not, of itself, constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the same offense except as otherwise modified or removed by an appropriate order of the Court" (West's A. I. C. 1978 ed.)

STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED

On December 29, 1977, the Prosecuting Attorney of Allen County, Indiana caused to be filed in Allen County Superior Court an "Information for Public Indecency" against the Appellants Dove, Pinkston, Petre and Johnson alleging that they knowingly appeared in public in a state of nudity, to-wit: showing of the human female breasts and buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipples and buttocks, in a public place, to-wit: The Scorpion, 1930 Broadway, Fort Wayne, Indiana in violation of *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3). Appellants filed a motion to dismiss on February 16, 1978 alleging that the statute was unconstitutional for vagueness and

overbreadth. On May 17, 1978, the motion to dismiss was granted and the cause was dismissed. The dismissal was made by an Order Book entry, there was no written judgment as such.

The decision was appealed by the Attorney General for the State of Indiana to the Supreme Court of Indiana. On December 3, 1979, the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the judgment of the trial court and upheld the statute as constitutional in a 3-2 decision. Each Justice in the minority filed a dissenting opinion.

The Appellants filed a motion for rehearing with the Indiana Supreme Court and that motion was denied on February 4, 1980.

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was filed with the Indiana Supreme Court on March 28, 1980 (App. C).

This cause presents a justiciable issue. There is a real and substantial controversy between the parties. The Appellants' right to exercise their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and expression by dancing in the nude is directly in conflict with the Indiana Public Indecency statute *I. C.* 35-45-4-1(a)(3) which went into effect on October 1, 1977. The Appellants claim that the statute is overbroad on its face while the Appellee claims overbreadth is not at issue because the activity proscribed is conduct rather than speech. Furthermore, Appellee claims that Appellants have no standing to raise the overbreadth issue because conduct is involved rather than speech. The Appellants rely upon *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975); the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment for their claim. The question was raised below and passed upon by the State court.

The Appellants also claim, as they did at the trial court level and in the Indiana Supreme Court, that the statute is unconstitutional for vagueness. A criminal statute must be strictly con-

strued and must define crimes with particularity and give fair warning of what the law intends to do in language that the common world will understand. *Connally* v. *General Construction Company,* 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). The provisions of the statute must give fair notice of their import to those to whom the statute is directed. *Communications Association* v. *Douds,* 339 U. S. 382, 412, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925, 951 (1950).

If we direct our attention to the language of the statute it is obvious that it is vague and ambiguous. For example: (1) Must the person or persons present at the time of the nudity be of the opposite sex?; (2) What is a public place and does the statute apply to restrooms, shower rooms, saunas, the civic theater, etc.?; (3) How much of the buttocks has to be covered and where do the buttocks start for the purpose of the statute?; (4) Would a piece of cloth the size of a pinhead be sufficient to constitute "less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipples"? The Appellee contends that the trial court erred in finding that the statute was vague because the trial court failed to give the statute a reasonable interpretation. The Appellants rely upon *Connally, supra,* and *Douds, supra;* and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The question was raised below and passed upon by the State court.

That the Appellants face a continuing threat of prosecution is not questioned because the nature of the Appellants' activity is such that it would attract sufficient attention of the authorities to prompt prosecution under the statute. Also, the authorities might refile the charges which were dismissed by the trial court. The decision of the Indiana Supreme Court is a final decision. The issue addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court was whether the Court below had erred in declaring the statute unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed that decision. *Indiana Code* 35-3.1-1-4(e) provides that the Prose-

cutor may refile charges on the same offense once the defect that caused the dismissal has been removed.

The question raised here is not hypothetical nor is it contingent. What the Appellants desire and proposed to do is not speculative. The threat of criminal prosecution is not vague or conditional; rather, it is actual, specific and immediate. Furthermore, the threat is a continuing one and remains as alive now as it has been at each other stage of this litigation. The Appellants do not seek an advisory opinion. They seek to have these important constitutional questions settled insofar as their claimed rights are concerned without subjecting themselves to the risk of further prosecution and fine and/or imprisonment.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257(2). Cases which sustain the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to review the judgment on appeal in this case include *Fletcher* v. *Peck,* 6 Cranch. 87 (1810); *Cohens* v. *Virginia,* 6 Wheat. 264 (1821); *Grayned* v. *City of Rockford,* 408 U. S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

1. Is *Indiana Code,* Section 35-45-4-1(a)(3), which prohibits a female from appearing nude "in a public place" in conflict with the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment for the reason that the statute is overbroad on its face?

2. Is *Indiana Code,* Section 35-45-4-1(a)(3) &(b) in conflict with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States in that said statute is vague?

3. Do the Appellants have the necessary standing to raise an overbreadth challenge to the constitutionality of *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3) and (b)?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 29, 1977, four different informations were filed by the Allen County, Indiana, Prosecutor against the four respective Appellants on whose behalf this appeal is taken. (R. P. 3).

[The Appellants on March 28, 1980 requested the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court to certify and transmit the complete record in this cause to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.]

Each of the defendants was charged with violation of *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3). The defendant Dove was specifically charged with appearing in a state of nudity by showing of the female buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering in a public place which was designated as The Scorpion. The defendant Johnson was charged with appearing in a state of nudity by showing of the female breasts with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipples and buttocks in a public place designated as The Scorpion. The defendant Pinkston was charged with appearing in a state of nudity by showing of the human female breasts and buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipples and buttocks in a public place which again was designated as The Scorpion. The defendant Petre was charged with appearing in a state of nudity by showing of the female breasts with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipples or buttocks in a public place designated as The Scorpion. (R. p. 3). It is without dispute that The Scorpion is a bar located at 1930 Broadway, Fort Wayne, Indiana and that the Appellants are dancers who perform there.

To each of the respective informations the individual defendants filed an identical motion to dismiss and discharge alleging vagueness and/or overbreadth of *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1. (R. p. 8; App. B, p. A4).

The Appellants filed an extensive memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. (R. pp. 8-17). The Appellee, through the Prosecuting Attorney for the 38th Judicial Circuit (Allen County) of the State of Indiana, filed an equally extensive memorandum of law in response. (R. pp. 19-30). On May 17, 1978, the motion to dismiss was granted without opinion by the trial court and the cause was dismissed. (R. p. 37). The dismissal was made by an Order Book entry; there was no written judgment as such. These cases were subsequently appealed by the Appellee through its Attorney General and consolidated, for purposes of appeal, with other cases emanating out of the Allen Superior Court dealing with similar issues. (App. B, p. A4). Since this cause was decided on Appellants' motion to dismiss without evidence, the above represents the underlying facts.

The appeal went directly to the Indiana Supreme Court pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(8) which gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction of an appellate case where a state statute has been declared to be unconstitutional. The appeal was filed in a timely manner and briefs were submitted by the opposing parties. A judgment, based upon a 3-2 decision for reversal, was entered by the Supreme Court of Indiana on December 3, 1979. In that judgment and opinion the Court also consolidated and reversed two other appeals which had, at least in part, raised similar issues of constitutionality and overbreadth. (App. B, p. A-4). One case involved a complaint by three businesses for an injunction and restraining order. (App. B, p. A-4). The other case involved a declaratory judgment sought by a dancer who made her living dancing in the nude. (App. B, p. A-4). This latter case has also been appealed to the United States Supreme Court under the title *Sue Clark* v. *State of Indiana and Lake County Prosecutor*. In each of these other two cases the trial court had declared the Indiana statute to be overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. (App. B, p. A-4).

THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

1. The Issue of Vagueness.

The federal question raised by the Appellant here, and at all stages of this action, is substantial because it is a fundamental requirement of criminal statutes that they must be definite and certain in order to be enforceable. The statute must give "fair warning" of the conduct that it makes a crime, i.e., it must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it as to exactly what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. Moreover, the requirement of certainty prevents arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of criminal statutes (i.e., it assures explicit standards to guide the police as well as the public). *Grayned* v. *City of Rockford,* 408 U. S. 104, 108-109, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227-228 (1972). The federal question is also substantial because it involves the freedom of speech and expression which is guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Against a constitutional challenge based on vagueness, the Supreme Court of Indiana has upheld as valid a statute which, in pertinent part, defines public indecency as appearing nude in a public place. *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3).

The Appellants contend this statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define what constitutes a public place and because the definition of nudity is so uncertain as to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement due to the lack of explicit standards to guide the police as well as the public.

The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether or not the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the term "public place" was undefined in the statute. The Court found no merit in the contention that the statute is vague because the words "public place" are undefined for the reason that ". . . the conduct involved here, i.e., nude dancing and appearances in taverns and bars, is clearly conduct in a 'public place'." (App.

B, p. A-6). In so holding, the Supreme Court of Indiana failed to cite any statutory or case law which has defined a bar or tavern as a "public place". In holding that a public place is "any place accessible to the public" (App. B, p. 7), the Court overlooked the effect that their holding might have on legitimate theater in the hands of overzealous law enforcement authorities. In determining that dancing in a bar or tavern is clearly conduct in a public place and subject to the statute, the Supreme Court of Indiana ignored a ruling precedent of the United States Supreme Court which allowed a ban on nude dancing in bars only when it has been included as a part of its liquor license program. *California* v. *LaRue*, 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1972). As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hunter, the purview of Indiana's public indecency statute is not limited to establishments where alcoholic beverages are served. The statute is couched in terms of nudity "in a public place". (App. B, p. A-21). The term "public place" is so vague that it can encompass publicly owned areas like streets, sidewalks, libraries, airports, beaches, etc., or it may also mean areas generally accessible to the public as a whole such as grocery stores, taverns and bars, the civic theater, schools and universities, etc. Obviously, nudity in some of these public places could be constitutionally protected as a form of free expression. Failing to define "public place" leaves the statute so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess whether it is applicable to them or not. Since the Indiana Public Indecency statute is not tied to any liquor license program it is impossible to know whether it would apply to the Appellants.

In its opinion the Supreme Court of Indiana discussed the issue of vagueness solely in the terms of "public place". The Supreme Court of Indiana failed to address other questions of vagueness regarding the definition of "nudity". One of the Appellants was charged with showing of the buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering and the others were charged with either showing of the female breasts with less than a

fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or were charged with showing both the buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering and the female breasts with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple. Such a definition leaves the Indiana public indecency statute open to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in that it does not assure explicit standards to guide the police as well as the public. For instance, how much of the buttocks has to be covered and where do the buttocks start for the purpose of the statute? And, would a piece of cloth the size of a pinhead be sufficient to constitute "less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple?"

2. The Overbreadth Issue.

The federal question raised by the Appellant here, and at all stages of this action, is substantial because it involves the freedom of speech and expression which is guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Against a constitutional challenge based upon overbreadth, the Supreme Court of Indiana has upheld as valid a statute which, in pertinent part, defines public indecency as appearing nude in a public place. *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3).

The Appellants contend that this statute is unconstitutional on its face because its language clearly sweeps within its prohibited activities not only all dancing in the nude regardless of the context, but also the appearance by any person in a state of nudity in any public place. Such a broad sweep of prohibition is clearly an infringement of the First Amendment since it is well established that a dance routine wherein the entertainer appears in the nude may be a form of expression guaranteed by freedom of speech. This fact was expressed most recently by this Court in *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975).

> "Although the customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in *California* v. *LaRue*, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S. Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that

this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In *LaRue*, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the states to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing and that a state could therefore ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license program.

"In the present case, the challenged ordinance applies not merely to places which serve liquor, but to many other establishments as well. The District Court observed, we believe correctly:

> 'The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing "in any public place" with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to interpretation of the term "any public place". It could include the theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the performance of the "Ballet Africains" and a number of other works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance. [Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, (E.D.N.Y. 1973) 364 F. Supp. 478, 483.]'

"We have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected speech or expression of other persons not before the court. As we said in *Grayned* v. *City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 114, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972):

> 'Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish Appellants' standing to raise an overbreadth challenge'." 422 U. S. at 932-33, 95 S. Ct. 2568-9, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 660.

The quoted language was considered below by the Supreme Court of Indiana and apparently rejected in favor of an inter-

pretation offered by the Appellee, the State of Indiana, which narrowly construed *Doran, supra,* as being interlocutory and therefore not directly resolving the question of the constitutionality of an almost identical statute. (App. B, pp. A-9, A-11). While the Appellant agrees that *Doran, supra,* arose as an interlocutory matter, the language from Justice Rehnquist's opinion quoted above is clear in its statement of the law. A statute such as *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1(a)(3) which prohibits one from appearing nude "in a public place" or "in any public place" is overbroad because it sweeps within its ambit protected speech or expression.

The majority of the Indiana Supreme Court, as did the Appellee, the State of Indiana, placed great emphasis on the statement found in *Doran, supra,* that nude dancing "might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances." 422 U. S. at 932, 95 S. Ct. at 2568, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 660. Yet, they ignore, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hunter, that the only circumstance under which the United States Supreme Court has allowed a ban on nude dancing has been when a state has included the ban as a part of its liquor license program. *California* v. *LaRue,* 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1972). Justice Hunter said, "[T]he purview of Indiana's public indecency statute is not limited to establishments where alcoholic beverages are served. The statute is couched in terms of nudity 'in a public place.' West's Ann. Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (1978)." (App. B, A-21).

3. Standing.

A portion of the decision by the Supreme Court of Indiana is directed toward an attack upon Appellants' standing to raise the issue of constitutionality and overbreadth:

> "This is a claim for some kind of right to appear nude in public and in this context, to appear nude in public for money. This activity is conduct, not speech, and as such,

this claim does not rise to the level of a First Amendment claim." (App. B, p. A-16).

The Appellants would argue that payment does not reduce the Appellants' activity to conduct not protected by the First Amendment (no evidence was presented that the Appellants in this appeal were paid). It goes without saying that a performer in a commercial ballet or theater production who dances in the nude is compensated monetarily. Were it a fact that payment would reduce Appellants' activities to mere conduct, then Appellants might lose their standing to raise the rights of others. However, there is no question that nude dancing, paid or unpaid, is a form of speech and expression and as such is entitled to constitutional protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975); *California* v. *LaRue*, 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1972). Even if *Indiana Code* 35-45-4-1 (a)(3), could somehow be constitutionally applied to the activities of these Appellants, they may rightfully challenge the statute if it is drawn so broad as to include the speech and expression of persons not before this Court. *Doran, supra; Grayned* v. *City of Rockford*, 408 U. S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972).

CONCLUSION

The decision below conflicts with decisions of this Court. It cannot be sustained on the grounds advanced by the Court below. The issues clearly involve the Constitution of the United States in that the state statute is vague and overbroad and is an invalid infringement on the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. For this reason, probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set down for hearing, or, in the alternative, the decision below should be summarily reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A

STATE OF INDIANA
Indianapolis, 46204

Clerk of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals
Marjorie H. O'Laughlin, Clerk
217 State House
Telephone 633-5200

No. 10785202 1078 S 202

State of Indiana v. Connie Sue Baysinger et al

You are hereby notified that the Supreme Court has on this day

Appellee, Connie Sue Baysinger, et al Petition for Rehearing is hereby Denied. DeBruler, A. C. J. Givan, C. J. and Prentice, JJ., Concur. DeBruler, and Hunter, JJ., Dissent.

Please acknowledge receipt of this notice in order that our records may show that you have been notified of this action.

Witness my name and the seal of said Court, this 4th day of February, 1980.

/s/ Marjorie H. O'Laughlin,
Clerk Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

APPENDIX B

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,
Appellant,
vs.
Connie Sue Baysinger, et al.,
Appellee.

No. 1078 S 202
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court
The Honorable Philip R. Thieme, Judge

State of Indiana, and Lake County Prosecutor,
Appellant,
vs.
Sue Clark,
Appellee.

No. 978 S 193
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
Room 3—Sitting at Gary, Indiana
The Honorable James Danikolas, Presiding

City of South Bend Michael Borkowski, Dean Bolerjack, Indiana State Police, William E. Voor, Jr.,
Appellants,
vs.
Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc. Donald E. Senst d/b/a the Spot Bar Riverview Lounge, Inc.,
Appellees.

No. 1078 S 227
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court
The Honorable E. Spencer Walton, Presiding.

PIVARNIK, *J.*

The Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of these causes pursuant to Ind. R. Ap. 4(A)(8) since these are appealable cases in which a state statute, Ind. Code 35-45-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1978) has been held to be unconstitutional by trial courts.

In the *Clark* case plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the State of Indiana which was amended on November 28, 1977. The Lake County Prosecutor's office filed a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings and the Attorney General's office filed a Motion to Dismiss, both of which were denied. After a short evidentiary hearing on February 24, 1978, the State's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings were renewed. On May 9, 1978, the court entered judgment finding Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1978) to be unconstitutional and restraining and enjoining the defendants from enforcing it. This appeal followed.

In *Baysinger, et al.*, each of the appellees was charged with indecent exposure pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1978), by informations filed in Allen Superior Court. *A Motion to dismiss was filed on* February 16, 1978, *alleging vagueness and/or overbreadth.* This motion was granted on May 17, 1978, and the cause dismissed. A motion to correct errors was filed and denied. On October 13, 1978, the State's motion for consolidation of appeal was granted by order of the Indiana Supreme Court. Pursuant to Ind. R. Ap. P. 5(B) eleven cases were consolidated under Cause No. 1078 S 202 for appeal.

In *Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., et al.*, the owners and operators of taverns and bars were ordered to cease offering nude dancing as entertainment. Appellees ceased to have nude dancing and filed a complaint for temporary and permanent injunction and restraining order against the State seeking to have Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 declared unconstitutional, alleging substantial loss of income. Their motion for a permanent injunction was granted upon a finding by the trial court that the nudity provision of Ind. Code § 35-45-5-1 was overbroad and thus unconstitutional. This appeal followed.

For convenience and to avoid unnecessary cost and delay, all of these appeals are consolidated here for opinion pursuant to Ind. R. Ap. P. 5(B). All involve the same conduct, nude

dancing or apperances in bars. *All involve the action of trial courts declaring Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 to be unconstitutional.* The statute in issue, Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1978) reads as follows:

> 35-45-4-1. Public Indecency.—(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally in a public place:
>
> (1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
>
> (2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
>
> (3) Appears in a state of nudity; or
>
> (4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
>
> (b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. [IC 35-45-4-1, as added by Acts 1976, P. L. 148, § 5, p. 718; 1977, P. L. 340, § 76, p. 1533.]

In considering the issue of the constitutionality of a statute,

> "We recognize that the Legislature is vested with a wide latitude of discretion in determining public policy. Therefore, every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality and such presumption continues until clearly overcome by a showing to the contrary. In the deliberative process, the burden is upon the challenger to overcome such presumption, and all doubts are resolved against his charge."

Sidle v. *Major* (1976), 264 Ind. 206, 341 N. E. 2d 763, 766.

I.

The State alleges error in the lower courts finding that the statute was vague and claims error in that the lower courts failed in their duty to give the statute a reasonable interpretation. Appellees contend that because the term "public place"

was undefined in the statute, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The question involved in such an inquiry is whether a challenged law is so vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." *Connally* v. *General Constr. Co.*, 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926). As the State has pointed out, the conduct involved here, i.e., nude dancing and appearances in taverns and bars, is clearly conduct in a "public place."

In Indiana, the definition of public indecency and public place has been considered and was early limited by the Court itself. In *McJunkins and Others* v. *The State* (1858), 10 Ind. 140, 145, involving a determination that certain improprieties of language were not intended to be included as a punishable offense under a charge of public indecency, the Court noted that:

> "It would therefore appear that the term public *indecency* has no fixed legal meaning—is vague and indefinite, and cannot in itself imply a definite offense. And hence, the Courts, by a kind of judicial legislation, in England and the United States, have usually limited the operation of the term to public displays of the naked person, the publication, sale, or exhibition of obscene books and prints, or the exhibition of a monster—acts which have a direct bearing on public morals, and affect the body of society."

In *Ardery* v. *State* (1877), 56 Ind. 328, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether or not the offense of public indecency, not being defined by statute, was punishable.

> "The enquiry, therefore, arises for this court to answer, is the exposure, in a public place, to divers persons there assembled, by a person, of his or her private parts, a public indecency? *Prima facie*, we think it is, if there is in the world any such thing as public indecency."

In commenting that there had existed such a thing as decency and such a thing as indecency since the time of Adam and Eve, the court affirmed the judgment even though "decency" forbade that the parts exposed be named in the statute.

During the intervening years, many standards have changed and statutes have been drawn more specifically and explicitly. Nevertheless, it appears that the basis for the offense of public indecency remain the same. The word public was further defined in *Peachey* v. *Boswell* (1960), 240 Ind. 604, 167 N. E. 2d 48, 56-57, in discussing the phrase, "In any place accessible to the public" with reference to a gambling statute. We stated as follows:

> "Webster defines "public" as "open to common and general use, participation, or enjoyment of the public. It has been held that the term "public place" as used in statutes pertaining to gambling includes any place which for the time being is made public by the assemblage of people who go there with or without invitation and *without restraint. Roberts* v. *State,* 1908, 4 Ga. App. 207, 60 S. E. 1082, 1085.
>
> A place may be accessible to the public for gambling notwithstanding that every person who desires is not permitted, access thereto. Lockhart v. State, 1853 10 Tex. 275, 276."
>
> "It has also been held that in a case involving a prohibition law that by "public" is meant that the public is invited to come to the place and has access to it for the purpose within the scope of the business there maintained. Brooks v. State, 1916, 19 Ga. App. 3, 90 S. E. 989, 991.
>
> "Accessible to the public" as used in the Act here in question has not been defined by either of the courts of appeal of this State, nor have we been able to find definition by the courts in other jurisdictions.
>
> From a consideration of the terms "accessible", "public", and "public place", as defined hereinabove, together with the purpose of the Act, we have concluded that the phrase "in any place accessible to the public" as used in § 10-2330, supra, means any place where the public is invited and are free to go upon special or implied invitation—a place available to all or a certain segment of the public."

We find no merit in the contention that the statute is vague because the word public is undefined.

II.

Appellants claim error in the trial court's finding that the statute is defective because of overbreadth, that is, that even if the meaning of the statute is clear, and, even though a nude dancer would know that her public nudity is a prohibited activity, the statute is unconstitutional if it sweeps too broad and regulates activities which cannot constitutionally be regulated. Consideration of this issue involves several claims. One is that because the appellees make their claim as a First Amendment claim, they may raise the rights of others, although there is no question that their conduct properly falls within the statute. This assertion of overbreadth depends initially upon a determination that the rights asserted are properly First Amendment rights and that therefore, they are entitled to consideration under the overbreadth doctrine.

This argument must have as its base that the activity involved here, appearing nude in bars and taverns and nude dancing in bars, is entitled to First Amendment protection. Appellees additionally argue that a statute directed at public nudity which does not limit its prohibition to certain sexual activity combined with nudity or one which prohibits all "public nudity" is unconstitutionally overbroad because some protected activity may be deterred. In other words, appellees argue that if there is any protected expression that could be included under a category of nudity in "public", this possibility would require our finding the public indecency statute to be overbroad. They claim that all prohibitions must be struck down unless somehow narrowed or tide to other regulations. They argue that if a statute could be read so as to prohibit not only topless and/or bottomless dancing in a tavern but also a production of the Ballet Africains at a public auditorium, then the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. Appellees also include in this argument concerns that "public place" may also apply to restrooms, shower rooms, saunas, and locker rooms.

In support of this argument appellees quote at length from cases arising in New York which went to the United States Supreme Court. In 1973, the town of North Hempstead, New York enacted an ordinance prohibiting topless entertainment. Three bar owners challenged the ordinance on its face.

A temporary restraining order was refused. One owner continued to offer topless entertainment and was served with criminal process. The other two owners refrained. A temporary injunction was issued. The Federal district court refused to abstain pending the state criminal proceedings and held that the ordinance was overbroad. *Salem Inn, Inc.*, v. *Frank*, 364 F. Supp. 478 (E. D. N. Y. 1973). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed at 501 F. 2d 18 (1974). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the temporary injunction as to the two owners but reversed as to the other, holding that absention was required. *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the ordinance was probably overbroad, thus justifying the injunction.

Appellees quote from the *Doran* opinion in support of their position as follows:

> "The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in 'any public place' with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of the term 'any public place.' It could include the theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and a number of other works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance." 364 F. Supp., at 483.

We have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it

on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected speech or expression of other persons not before the Court. As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972):

> 'Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.' "

Doran v. *Salem Inn, Inc.* (1975), 422 U. S. 922, 933, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 2568-69, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648, 660. Appellees argue that this case requires the striking down of any "across the board" regulation of nudity.

The State, emphasizing the part of this opinion which refrains from stating a view on the merits argues that all *Doran, supra,* holds is that this form of entertainment, i.e., nude dancing, might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances and that *Doran* is merely an interlocutory appeal and did not resolve the question of the constitutionality of the statute. The appellants also allege error in the trial court finding the statute overbroad, arguing that the activity involved is conduct, not speech, and that, therefore, challenge based on alleged facial invalidity is not available to appellees.

California v. *LaRue* (1972), 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, *reh. denied,* 410 U. S. 948, 93 S. Ct. 1351, 35 L. Ed. 2d 615, held that in view of the State's broad authority to control the sale of intoxicating liquors under the Twenty-first Amendment, regulations proscribing some acts which were not obscene and possibly within the limits of the First and Fourteenth Amendments' protection of freedom of expression did not violate the Federal Constitution. The specific portion of *LaRue* upon which the court in *Doran* relied is as follows:

> "The substance of the regulations struck down prohibits licensed bars or nightclubs from displaying, either in the form of movies or live entertainment, 'performances' that partake more of gross sexuality than of communication. While we agree that at least some of the performances to

which these regulations address themselves are within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that California has not forbidden these performances across the board. It has merely proscribed such performances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink.

Viewed in this light, we conceive the State's authority in this area to be somewhat broader than did the District Court. This is not to say that all such conduct and performance is without the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But we would poorly serve both the interests for which the State may validly seek vindication and the interests protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments were we to insist that the sort of bacchanalian revelries that the Department sought to prevent by these liquor regulations were the constitutional equivalent of a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater."

409 U. S. 109, 118, 93 S. Ct. 390, 397, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 352. However, in *LaRue* the court also distinguished between written expression and public acts as follows:

"But as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases. States may sometimes proscribe expression that is directed to the accomplishment of an end that the State has declared to be illegal when such expression consists, in part, of 'conduct' or 'action' "

Id. at 117, 93 S. Ct. at 396, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 351.

We read *La Rue* to caution against attempting to censor dramatic performances in theaters or in movies which may be protected expression.

As noted in *Crownover* v. *Musick* (1973), 107 Cal. Reptr. 681, 509 P. 3d 497, *cert. den. sub nom., Owen* v. *Musick,* 415 U. S. 931, 94 S. Ct. 1443, 39 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1974):

"A close reading of the *LaRue* opinion reveals that the only area of regulation involved in that case which the Supreme Court found within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression was that of motion pictures and theatrical productions."

See also Gabriel v. *Town of Old Orchard Beach* (1978); *People* v. *Karns,* 81 Misc. 2d 186, 365 N. Y. S. 2d 725 (Cty. Ct. Rochester, Monroe Co. 1975); *Kew* v. *Senter,* 416 F. Supp. 1101 (N. D. Tex. 1976).

We recognize the existence of cases cited by the appellees to indicate that some courts have held that the regulation of nude dancing through public indecency statutes or ordinances, when such laws are not tied to the regulation of alcoholic beverages, may be unconstitutional. *See New York Topless Bar and Dancers Assoc.* v. *New York State Liquor Authority,* 398 N. Y. S. 2d 637, 637 n. 2. (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); *People* v. *Nixon,* 390 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1976); *Lucifers Gate, Inc.* v. *Town of Van Buren,* 373 N. Y. S. 2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1975). Other courts in other jurisdictions have held similar statutes to be overbroad, *Jamaica Inn, Inc.* v. *Daley,* 368 N. E. 2d 589 (Ill. App. 1977).

Other courts have attempted to construe the term public place in public indecency laws to exclude places where persons willing enter. *See Yauch* v. *State,* 514 P. 2d 709 (Ariz. 1973); *State* v. *Brooks,* 550 P. 2d 440 (Ore. 1976).

It is obvious that this area is confused by the consideration of overlapping concepts of nudity, public indecency, and obscenity in differing contexts.

Appellees assert that even though the conduct involved here is nudity in public and clearly would fall within the prohibitions of the statute, the legislature is unable to prohibit such conduct unless the statute includes requirements of a showing that the nudity involved is obscene. Apparently this concept is traceable to cases primarily dealing with other areas and performances such as films, books, and theatrical performances. *See Erzoznik* v. *City of Jacksonville,* 422 U. S. 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (films); *Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.* v. *Conrad,* (1975) 420 U. S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448 (prior restraint of stage production of *Hair*).

Cases involving such issues have continued to maintain certain distinctions between such concepts and to acknowledge

that indecent public conduct is not included in the express exceptions allowed on the basis of the First Amendment. In the "Carnal Knowledge" film case, *Jenkins* v. *Georgia* (1974), 418 U. S. 153, 161, 94 S. Ct. 2750, 2755, 41 L. Ed. 2d 642, 650, nudity and obscenity were discussed, and it was stated that nudity alone was not enough to make material legally obscene citing *Miller* v. *California* (1973), 413 U. S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419. However, the *Miller* case itself noted that:

> "Although we are not presented here with the problem of regulating lewd public conduct itself, the States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior."

413 U. S. at 26, 93 S. Ct. at 2616, n. 8.

In *Erzoznik* v. *City of Jacksonville*, 422 U. S. 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) a local ordinance was passed which prohibited the showing of films containing nudity by a drive-in theater when its screen was visible from a public street or place. The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional. However, the Court added in a footnote:

> "Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. . . . In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. . . . ('No one would suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in a public place'). (citations omitted) *Id.* at 211, 95 S.Ct. at 2273, n. 7."

Thus it appears that certain public conduct which involves nudity may be regulated on a standard different from that provided for movies or books. Here we note the existence of Ind. Code § 35-30-10.1-1 et seq. (Burns 1975) which may more properly be applied to such materials and performances and includes obscenity criteria. However, it appears obvious that as the content of the written material, motion picture, pictorial

representation or live performance diminishes and we approach simply appearing nude in public, determining whether or not nudity is obscene becomes extremely difficult because the context is so limited. Therefore, the application of obscenity considerations to books, films and certain types of live musical or theatrical performances or productions seems more appropriate. In those settings, nudity, which may or may not be obscene, may be judged as are all other components of such materials or performances, in the context on which it is presented. There is sufficient content to enable courts to determine whether or not such nudity is obscene and therefore prohibited or whether, taken in its context, it is not obscene and requires protection as expression. However, the legislature is not required to provide for proof of obscenity before public nudity may be prohibited.

In appellees final and main contention they claim that this statute must fall because it could, in some other fact situations be used to suppress protected expression. These situations, it is alleged, could involve nudity within the context of a play, ballet, movie, book or other material. Thus, the argument goes that because of the potential for restriction of material or performances involving the communication of ideas, or speech, it is constitutionally required to tolerate or to allow some nudity in some contexts as part of some larger form of expression. Appellees argue that we must therefore conclude that we may not prohibit public nudity. We do not find this persuasive.

Consideration of their claim that the public indecency statute is overbroad requires a review of that basic doctrine. In *Broadrick* v. *Oklahoma,* 413 U. S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, the United States Supreme Court held that in general, constitutional rights are personal and the Court will consider only the allegations of unconstitutionality in a particular fact situation which the plaintiff has brought to court. An exception to this general rule allows a challenge of alleged facial in-

validity in the area of free speech. However, this exception is limited.

> ". . . But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protective speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. (citation omitted.) To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."

Id. at 615, 93 S. Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 842.

Under our statutes and case law, public nudity itself, regardless of a showing of obscenity, and without requiring proof of obscenity, is conduct which traditionally has been held to be public indecency, which is within the power of the legislature to prohibit. There is no right to appear nude in public. Rather, it may be constitutionally required to tolerate or to allow some nudity as a part of some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the communication of ideas is involved. A critical part of the final issue to be decided relates to whether appearing nude or performing a nude dance as presented in these cases is simply conduct or is expression entitled to First Amendment protection. In the cases before us it is clear the activity involved is appearing nude or dancing in the nude in bars and is conduct. Appellees make no claim that there is any

pure speech involved in their appearances. They make no claim that the expression of any ideas is involved or inhibited because of the restriction on nudity in a public place. The injury claimed by the individual dancers and the owners and operators of the bars is that they lose money if unable to appear nude in public or to offer nude dancing in their establishments. They complain that they make less money appearing scantily clad than they make when they appear nude. This is a claim for some kind of right to appear nude in public and in this context, to appear nude in public for money. This activity is conduct, not speech, and as such, this claim does not rise to the level of a First Amendment claim. The governmental interest in prohibiting conduct that has long been recognized as public indecency is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Our case law has restricted and defined the type of conduct which has been prosecuted under public indecency statutes. Our statutes provide for procedures and standards to be used in a determination of obscenity when required for different materials or performances. Under these facts the argument that Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1978) is overbroad must fail. Certainly the presumption of constitutionality with which each statute is clothed is not clearly overcome. We reverse the judgments of the lower courts, order the injunctions issued to be lifted, and declare Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 to be constitutional as a valid exercise of the police powers of the state.

GIVAN, *C. J.*, and PRENTICE, *J.*, concur.

HUNTER, *J.*, and DEBRULER, *J.*, dissent with separate opinions.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

State of Indiana, *Appellant,* *vs.* Connie Sue Baysinger et al., *Appellees.*	No. 1078 S 202 Appeal from Allen Superior Court Honorable Philip R. Thieme, Judge
State of Indiana and Lake County Prosecutor, *Appellant,* *vs.* Sue Clark, *Appellee.*	No. 978 S 193 Appeal from Lake Superior Court 3 Honorable James Danikolas, Special Judge
City of South Bend, Michael Borkowski, Dean Bolerjack, Indiana State Police, William E. Voor, Jr., *Appellants,* *vs.* Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., Donald E. Senst d/b/a The Spot Bar Riverview Lounge, Inc., *Appellees.*	No. 1078 S 227 Appeal from St. Joseph Superior Court Honorable E. Spencer Walton, Special Judge

DEBRULER, *J.*—Dissenting

In my opinion the judgments of the trial courts below should be affirmed. In *State* v. *Baysinger and others,* No. 1978 S 202, appellees were charged with appearing in a state of nudity by showing the female breasts and buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of the nipples and buttocks at a night club, The Scorpion in violation of Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (Burns

1978). Appellees filed a motion to dismiss and discharge contending that the statute was unconstitutional and the trial court sustained the motion. The judgments in the other two cases arose in different postures, but are to the same effect, i.e., that Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 is unconstitutional on its face for reasons of overbreadth insofar as its proscribes public nudity in public places. That part of the statute dealing with public nudity applicable here provides:

> "(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
>
> * * * * *
>
> (3) Appears in a state of nudity;
>
> * * * * *
>
> commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
>
> (b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female . . . buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple. . . ."

In *Grody* v. *State* (1972), 257 Ind. 651, 278 N. E. 2d 280, this Court invalidated a state criminal statute because of unconstitutional overbreadth and there described the doctrine as follows:

> "A penal statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if its sanctions are applicable to activities that are protected by the First Amendment. Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U. S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1786, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214. . . . The invalidity of such a statute rests on the fact that it constitutes a substantial deterrent to the free exercise of important First Amendment rights." 257 Ind. at 653.

The issue presented here then is whether a person could be criminally liable under Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1, for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment. The crime defined by this statute occurs when a female person appears at any time, in any manner, in any public place, for any purpose, with naked breast. The statute is indifferent to verbal or other conduct in

which the person may be engaged at the time or the presence and rights of others who may be in the same place at the same time. This statute would empower law enforcement officials to arrest and prosecute a nude woman dancer or actress in a professional stage production or a nude woman engaged in a public meeting the purpose of which is to educate about and encourage infant breast feeding or self-examination for breast cancer. It would permit the arrest and prosecution of models who may pose in the nude for art classes at our state universities. Activities of these sorts involving live performances, the dance, and educational activities are afforded the broadest First Amendment protection. *Schacht* v. *United States* (1970), 398 U. S. 58, 90 S. Ct. 1555, 26 L. Ed. 2d 44; *California* v. *LaRue* (1972), 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342; *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.* (1975), 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648. This statute is clearly unconstitutionally overbroad. Furthermore, the statute is so grossly overbroad that no court could construe it so as to render it free from this constitutional defect as to do so would require the court to exercise a legislative authority, a role we cannot assume. *Grody* v. *State, supra.*

HUNTER, *J.*—Dissenting.

I must dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I would ascribe greater weight than does the majority to the following language from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc.* (1975), 422 U. S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648.

"The District Court observed, we believe correctly:

> " 'The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in "any public place" with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of the term "any public place." It could include the theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the performance of the "Ballet Africains' and a number of other works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance.' [*Salem Inn, Inc.* v. *Frank* (E. D. N. Y. 1973), 364 F. Supp. 478, 483.]

"We have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected speech or expression of other persons not before the Court. As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 114, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972):

> " 'Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.' "

422 U. S. at 933, 95 S. Ct. 2568-9, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 660.

The majority emphasizes that the Court held that nude dancing "might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances." 422 U. S. at 932, 95 S. Ct. at 2568, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 660. Yet, the only circumstance under which the United States Supreme Court has allowed a ban on

nude dancing has been when a state has included the ban as part of its liquor license program. *California* v. *LaRue* (1972), 409 U. S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342. The purview of Indiana's public indecency statute is not limited to establishments where alcoholic beverages are served. The statute is couched in terms of nudity "in a public place." West's Ann. Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (1978).

I believe the quoted language from *Doran* v. *Salem Inn, Inc., supra,* stands for the proposition that a public indecency statute which prohibits nudity in any public place is unconstitutionally overbroad. See *Jamaica Inn, Inc.* v. *Daley* (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 257, 368 N. E. 2d 589.

I would affirm the judgments of the trial courts below.

APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

State of Indiana *Appellant* *(Plaintiff Below)* *vs.*	No. 1078 S 202 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court Misdemeanor and Traffic Division.
Connie Sue Baysinger, et al. *Appellee* *(Defendants Below)*	The Honorable Philip R. Thieme, Judge

PROOF OF FILING

Jerrald A. Crowell respectfully shows to the Court:

1. That he is the attorney for the Appellees, Dove Pinkston, Petrie and Johnson, in the above-entitled cause.

2. That on the 28th day of March, 1980, he deposited in the United States mail, charges prepaid, certified, return receipt requested, nine (9) copies of Appellees Notice of Appeal to the United States Supreme Court and nine (9) copies of Request for Certification of Record to United States Supreme Court together with two (2) copies of proof of service of said Notice of Appeal and Request of Certification addressed to the Clerk of this Court at the State House, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204.

/s/ Jerrald A. Crowell
Jerrald A. Crowell
Bowman & Crowell
1900 Fort Wayne Bank Building
Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802
Telephone: 219/743-4451
Attorney for Appellees, Roxanne Dove, Lucy Mae Pinkston, Barbara Petrie and Vonnie Joe Johnson

STATE OF INDIANA }
COUNTY OF ALLEN } SS:

Jerrald A. Crowell, being first duly sworn, says that the statements contained in the above and foregoing proof of filing are true.

/s/ Jerrald A. Crowell
Jerrald A. Crowell

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, this 27th day of March, 1980.

/s/ Pam Abdul-fattah
Pam Abdul-fattah, *Notary Public*
Resident of Allen County

My Commission Expires:
December 5, 1983

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

State of Indiana *Appellant* *(Plaintiff Below)* *vs.* Connie Sue Baysinger, et al. *Appellee* *(Defendants Below)*	No. 1078 S 202 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court Misdemeanor and Traffic Division. ——— The Honorable Philip R. Thieme, Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Appellees, Roxanne Dove, Lucy Mae Pinkston, Barbara Petrie and Vonnie Joe Johnson, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final order reversing the dismissal of the prosecution by the Allen Superior Court, entered herein on February 4, 1980, said order being a denial of Appellees' petition for rehearing of the judgment entered on December 3, 1979.

/s/ Jerrald A. Crowell
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Telephone: 219/743-4451
Attorney for Appellees, Roxanne Dove, Lucy Mae Pinkston, Barbara Petrie and Vonnie Joe Johnson

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
JUN 3 1980
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-1720

CONNIE SUE BAYSINGER, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Indiana
MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-1720

CONNIE SUE BAYSINGER, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee.

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

The appellee, the State of Indiana, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss this appeal or affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana entered by that Court in Cause No. 1078 S 202, on December 3, 1979.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana is reported at 397 N.E.2d 580. That opinion and two dissenting opinions by justices of that court are appended to the Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement. This Court's summary dismissal of an appeal from the same Indiana Supreme Court decision by another party (*Clark v. Indiana*, No. 79-1325) is attached hereto as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

Appellants allege that jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana on appeal in this case is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257(2). However, appellees would assert that there is no jurisdiction in this court to review this case on appeal since there is no substantial federal question involved, and since the decision appealed from rests sufficiently on state grounds.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL

The appellee would assert that the issues presented in this appeal are:

1. Whether the appellant has properly presented to this Court a federal question of substance.

2. Whether the appellant has the necessary standing to raise overbreadth and vagueness challenges to the constitutionality of Indiana Code Section 35-45-4-1(a)(3) and (b).

Appellants have alleged that there is a federal question in their assertion that portions of IC 35-45-4-1, which prohibits a person (not just a "female" as asserted by appellants) from appearing nude in a public place, is in conflict with the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as applied to the State by the Fourteenth Amendment, due to the alleged factual overbreadth and vagueness of the statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Appellants have alleged the involvement of the following provisions of the Constitution of the United States:

Amendments, Article One:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Amendments, Article Fourteen:

"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

"* * *"

Indiana Code, Section 35-45-4-1 is in issue. The full text of the Statute is as follows:

35-45-41. [Public indecency]—(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:

(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;

(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;

(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or

(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.

(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.

A class A misdemeanor in Indiana carries a penalty of a term of imprisonment fixed at from one day to one year to which in addition may be added a fine of not more than $5,000.00. Indiana Code 35-50-3-2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Nature of the Case

This appeal, filed by plaintiff below, arises from a consolidated case wherein the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the validity of IC 35-45-4-1, facially and as applied, thereby reversing the trial court cases which were appealed to that Court by the State of Indiana; among these cases are the ones brought to this Court by this direct appeal. The trial court cases subject of this appeal were commenced on December 29, 1977, by the filing of four different informations by the Prosecutor of Allen County, Indiana, against the four respective appellants, Dove, Pinkston, Petre, and Johnson, taking this appeal, charging violations of IC 35-45-4-1(a)(3). Baysinger is the name of a party in a case consolidated with these appellants' cases in the Indiana Supreme Court; she is not a party to this appeal, which should probably therefore be called *Dove v. Indiana.*

II. Course of the Proceedings Below

As stated immediately above, appellants were charged on December 29, 1977 by four informations filed in Allen County, Indiana, with violations of IC 35-45-4-1(a)(3).

Appellees do not disagree with appellants' characterization of the contents of the informations. The individual defendants (appellants herein) filed identical motions to dismiss and discharge the indictments.

The trial court granted without opinion the motions to dismiss, on May 17, 1978. The State appealed directly to

the Indiana Supreme Court, consolidating with the *Baysinger* case under Cause No. 1078 S 202.

In that Court, these cases were consolidated with two others in which a Superior Court had found IC 35-45-4-1 (a)(3) unconstitutional. *City of South Bend, et al. v. Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc.*, No. 1078 S 227, in which the appellees sought and obtained injunctive relief to prevent the city police and others from enforcing the statute; and *Lake County Prosecutor and State of Indiana v. Sue Clark*, No. 978 S 193, in which the appellee sought and obtained declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of the statute.

These cases were decided in favor of the constitutionality of IC 35-45-4-1 by the Indiana Supreme Court on December 3, 1979. That decision, and two dissenting opinions, are printed as Appendix B to appellants' "Jurisdictional Statement," and are reported under the name *State v. Baysinger*, — Ind. —, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979).

These appellants, Dove, Pinkston, Petre, and Johnston, brought this appeal.

Since then, this Court, on May 12, 1980, dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, *Clark v. Indiana* which, like this case, was an appeal from *State v. Baysinger, supra.*

III. Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented For Review

Since this case was appealed from a granting of a motion to dismiss, there are very few facts of record. The decision of the Indiana Supreme Court which is the subject of this appeal, appears to accept as fact that all the appellees therein (including appellants here) were employed as dancers and appeared nude or would do so but for the statute. Since the four appellants in this case originally prevailed on a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the dismissed

complaint, taken as if true for appellate purposes, are that each of them appeared showing either the female breasts with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, in a bar in Fort Wayne, Indiana, called "The Scorpion."

REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE APPEAL OR AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT BELOW

1. Appellant does not present to this Court a Federal Question of Substance.

This Court has scrupulously adhered to the rule that it will not review judgments of state courts which rest upon non-federal or independent state grounds sufficient to support the judgment. *Henry v. Mississippi,* 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 242 (1965); *Herb v. Pitcairn,* 324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459, 89 L.Ed. 789, supp.op. 325 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 954, 89 L.Ed. 1483, reh. den. 325 U.S. 893, 65 S.Ct. 1188, 89 L.Ed. 2005 (1945).

The state court opinion appealed from herein addressed two main issues: Whether the statute is vague, and whether the statute is overbroad in that it, while properly embracing and regulating appellant's own actions, sweeps too broadly and regulates impermissibly other conduct which is protected against such regulation.

Appellees would assert that both main issues were decided on non-Federal grounds.

The vagueness argument rested on the use of the term "public place", not specifically defined in IC 35-45-4-1, as the definition of the places where the conduct proscribed by the statute is punishable. The Indiana Supreme Court found that in Indiana law the basis for the offense of public indecency has been consistent in state law and that

"public" in this context clearly meant, in Indiana law, "any place accessible to the public"; that is, any place where the public is invited and are free to go upon special or implied invitation—a place available to all or a certain segment of the public." *State of Indiana v. Baysinger,* — Ind. —, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979), citing *Peachey v. Boswell,* 240 Ind. 604, 167 N.E.2d 48, 56-57 (1960). Clearly, the Court's finding of no impermissible vagueness in IC 35-45-4-1 rests on purely State law, and cannot be a subject of appellate review in this action.

Appellants reiterate a question not specifically treated in the Indiana decision by alleging that there is impermissible vagueness in the statutory definition of "nudity," IC 35-45-4-1(b). The two clauses so attacked are "showing of the human male or female buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, [or] the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple. . .". They claim use of the terms "buttocks" and "any part of the nipple" are so vague that the statute leaves a citizen uncertain what is supposed to be covered.

The basic standard in a vagueness claim is that the statute give fair warning of conduct which it prohibits to persons of ordinary intelligence. *Bouie v. City of Columbia,* 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). Absolute precision is not a constitutional requirement as long as the statute fairly indicates to a reasonable man what actions are prohibited. *Baggett v. Bullit,* 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964).

The common ordinary meaning of the words employed by the statute provide the requisite fair notice to any reasonable person. Appellants purport not to understand where the buttocks start so that they don't know what must be covered. Webster's Second International Dictionary, Una-

bridged, defined "buttock" thus: "The part at the back of the hip, which in man forms one of the protruberances on which he sits; in *pl.*, the rump." The American Heritage Dictionary defines "buttock" as "Either of the two rounded parts of the rump." It is obvious that the whole rounded protruberances at the back of the hips are what is to be covered and that the words of the statute are clearly ascertainable by any reasonable person.

Appellants do not allege to be uncertain as to what a "nipple" is or where it starts. Their alleged confusion is over which part the "any part" of it is that must be covered, and hypothesize that this "any part" may be the size of a pinhead. Thereby they are straining the word "any" into an obviously unintended interpretation. The word "any" in the statute does not refer to a part covered but to a part "with less than a fully opaque covering." If any such part exists, the statute is violated. It is a clear requirement to leave no such part uncovered. Again, it is not vague, being clearly understood by a reasonable person.

The remaining issue in the Indiana Supreme Court decision was whether the statute is overbroad in that its sweep extended impermissibly into realms of speech protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The opinion being appealed from makes it clear that public indecency has long been punishable in Indiana, always including within its prohibition nudity in a public place. *McJunkins and Others v. The State of Indiana,* 10 Ind. 140, 145 (1858); *Ardery v. State of Indiana,* 56 Ind. 328 (1877). The current statute has been on the books only since 1977 because of a general recodification of the criminal law of the State of Indiana occurring that year.

The offense of public indecency was thought to be a crime at common law. *Yauch v. City of Tucson,* 514 P.2d 709, 710 (Ariz., 1973); *Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted,* 370 F.Supp. 506, 508 (1974); *Hoffman v. Carson,* 250 So.2d 891, 49 A.L.R.3d 1078 (Fla., 1971), app. dism'd 404 U.S. 981, 92 S.Ct. 453, 30 L.Ed.2d 365 (1971). Because of the relationship to the public welfare of exposing sexual organs and nudity, regulation or prohibition thereof has been held to be within the police power of the State Legislature. *Hoffman, supra; Starshock, Inc., supra; Wayside Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach,* 208 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Va., 1974); *State of Ohio ex rel. Church v. Brown,* 133 N.E.2d 333, (Ohio, 1956), app. dism'd 352 U.S. 884, 77 S.Ct. 126, 1 L.Ed. 2d 82.

This Court recognized that the State may regulate public nudity when, in *Miller v. California,* 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 at 2615-2616, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), it said, "Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation *any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited without limit in public places.*" (emphasis added); lewd public conduct itself is within the permissible bounds of state regulation, even if a verbal description of it might in some circumstances be protected. *Miller, supra,* 413 U.S., at 26 n. 8, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419.

The Court reiterated the point later in *Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville,* 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975):

> "Scenes of nudity in a movie, like pictures of nude persons in a book, must be considered as a part of the whole work. . . . In this respect such nudity is distinguishable from the kind of public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws. . . . ('No one would suggest that the First Amendment

permits nudity in a public place'). (citations omitted.) *Id.* at 211, 95 S.Ct. at 2273, n. 7''

The *Miller* and *Erzoznik* cases thus, in a context which has bearing on the instant case, clearly distinguish statutes which, like IC 35-45-4-1, are directed at conduct instead of speech, from obscenity statutes, which are directed at speech itself. The ability to legislate against conduct exists even when directly exercised against actions which do have some degree of expressive value. *United States v. O'Brien, post.* (Appellants herein do not allege that there is any expressive content to the nudity in their dancing, or indeed in the dancing itself.)

In *Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.*, 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d (1975), this court stated that ''. . . the customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression. . . .''

The leading case of *United States v. O'Brien,* 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), would allow state regulation of conduct even ''. . . when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct''; a ''sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on the First Amendment.'' *id.* at 367, 88 S.Ct. at 1678. (*O'Brien,* of course, involved a symbolic protest against a broad range of governmental policies connected with war and military draft registration, and thus a rather serious expressive content.)

The argument against granting the appeal can be summarized as follows: (1) The State's power to regulate public nudity is long-standing and is a valid exercise of the police power; (2) it serves an important governmental interest in order, decency, morality, and public welfare. (3) Public indecency statutes prohibiting public nudity, in-

cluding IC 35-45-4-1, are directed against conduct only, and not against any kind of speech. (4) Injury to the small amount of protected speech, if any, is incidental and insubstantial when compared to the legitimate sweep of the statute. (5) There is, therefore, no "right", federally-protected or otherwise, to go naked in a public place, free of the strictures of such public indecency statutes. (6) There is no vagueness issue cognizable in this action concerning Indiana's definition of "public place" because the vagueness allegation raised in this cause has already been settled by the state courts on all-state grounds. (7) Appellants have alleged the existence of no attempt at expression in the course of the enterprise involved. (8) Appellants' nude dance conduct thus included no federally-protected right and the State's regulation of their costuming could not have affected any personal federally-protected right. (9) Therefore, no substantial federal question has been raised herein, and the appeal ought to be dismissed or judgment affirmed.

Against this argument, supported as it is by the authorities given above, Appellants allege a "right" to dance nude in public, which is apparently based on just two cases, *California v. LaRue,* 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); and *Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,* 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975).

LaRue, of course, *upheld* California's ability to prohibit nude barroom dancing, which is precisely the conduct Appellant was engaged in. The majority opinion in that case held *both* that the Twenty-First Amendment conferred ". . . something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare and morals . . ." when in connection with regulation of the alcoholic beverage trade, *and* that ". . . the States, vested as they are with general police

power, require no specific grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to matters traditionally within the scope of the police power . . .'' 401 U.S. at 114, 93 S.Ct. at 395. *LaRue,* therefore, does not stand for the proposition that a State cannot enact a general ban on public nudity aside from on ''licensed premises''. It is more accurate to characterize *LaRue* by saying that the State has a great deal of power to legislate concerning public indecency, which is only strengthened by the operation of the Twenty-First Amendment.

The *Doran* case should not have been cited for any substantive proposition regarding nudity. It was interlocutory only, and in essence held merely that since there might exist a set of facts in which nude dancing might contain protected expression, a Federal District Court Judge could not as a matter of law be said to have violated his discretion in enjoining enforcement of an anti-nudity statute. This Court explicitly stated in *Doran* that its refusal to rule against the lower court's grant of interim relief was limited to its upholding of judicial discretion, and expressed no view as to the merits of the contentions of the respondent, who was the proponent of the ''right'' to nude public dancing. 422 U.S. at 933, 95 S.Ct. at 2569.

Subsequent cases have adopted, or at least supported, the above view of the *Doran* case. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted that in *Doran,* this Court held, at most, ''. . . that 'the customary ''barroom'' type of nude dancing' *may involve* only the barest minimum of protected expression.'' *Gabriel v. Town of Old Orchard Beach,* 390 A.2d 1065 at 1069 (Me., 1978). Emphasis of the court's. In *Kew v. Senter,* 416 F.Supp. 1191 (U.S.D.C.No.D. Tex., 1976), the court took due note of *Doran* and held nevertheless that the Texas statute therein was, ''. . . primarily, if

not exclusively, directed at nonverbal, physical conduct, an activity which Texas has greater constitutional power to regulate than speech in general . . .'' *id.* at 1104.

It is entirely clear, therefore, that on the facts in this appeal, there is no substantial federal question.

2. Appellant does not have necessary standing to raise an overbreadth challenge to IC 35-45-4-1.

It is a basic constraint to challenges to statutes that a person must not raise or argue the constitutional rights of others. Constitutional rights are personal, and courts normally consider allegations of unconstitutionality only in light of the particular facts brought forth by the plaintiff. *Broadrick v. Oklahoma,* 413 U.S. 60, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830 (1973). This proposition, if there were not an exception, would end our discussion here since appellants brought forth no such facts, alleging a curtailment of any expression in their dance, and failed to establish a right to engage in commercial nude barroom dancing. When the constitutional challenge does not factually apply to the litigant, the overbreadth exception may permit the challenge if the overbreadth extends to the area of free speech and the case involves a statute's facial invalidity. However, this exception is carefully limited. It does not apply if a statute marginally infringing upon a third-person's First Amendment rights as a whole does cover a range of easily identifiable and properly prohibited conduct. *U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,* 413 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). Another limitation to the facial overbreadth exception exists if conduct as well as speech is involved, and where, although the overbreadth to others may be real, such overbreadth is not substantial, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-

mate sweep. In *Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra,* this Court stated:

> "... But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protective speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. (citation omitted) To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."

Broadrick, id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d at 842.

Case law has plainly established that public nudity is conduct, not speech. The overbreadth adjudication exception has therefore been attenuated, to an extent that the conduct of public nudity, even if expressive, is within the scope of legitimate state controls and is justified for the reasons given in *Broadrick, supra.*

In *Kew v. Senter,* 416 F.Supp. 1101 (U.S.D.C.No.D. Texas, 1976), decided after *Doran,* the statutes involved were Texas Penal Code sections 21.08 (Indecent exposure) and 42.01 (Disorderly conduct). The kernel of both statutes was exposure of the anus or genitals in a public place,

coupled with some specific intent or recklessness about offending others. The *Kew* court recognized that the statutes were directed primarily, "if not exclusively" at physical conduct, ". . . an activity which Texas has greater constitutional power to regulate than speech in general—even speech depicting or describing the same subject." (citing *Miller, supra*). 416 F.Supp. 1104. The *Kew* court went on:

> "In light of this recognition, plaintiff's challenge to the statutes for facial overbreadth is not compelling. It may be that one or more of the statutes in question could be applied to punish other conduct arguably protected by the First Amendment, such as application of Section 42.01(a)(10) to a nude ballet; but where the behavior condemned falls so far down the scale toward conduct as that treated by these statutes and so far from 'pure speech', overbreadth analysis becomes quite restricted. (Citing *Broadrick*) At this point on the speech-conduct spectrum, a conclusion that any of these statutes is facially overbroad would require a conclusion on our part that the amount of protected activity embraced by it is 'substantial . . . judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' (citation omitted) This we are unable to do as to any of the statutes attacked."

Kew v. Senter, id.

The Indiana Supreme Court has decided this case in accordance with the principles of overbreadth litigation as enunciated by this Court in *Broadrick, supra;* it reached the same result as the Federal District Court in *Kew.*

Since appellants' conduct is unarguably within the power of the state to regulate (*LaRue, supra*), and the regulation itself is directed at a whole range of non-speech conduct amounting to public indecency and has but an incidental

or insubstantial effect on arguably protected speech when compared to its legitimate sweep, and is, moreover, plainly an exercise of legitimate police powers of the Legislature, the plaintiff has no standing to urge the First Amendment overbreadth exception. Having already failed to establish any *personal* infringement of a federally protected right (part one, *supra*), plaintiff-appellant also fails properly to raise the First Amendment issue on overbreadth grounds. It must therefore be concluded that plaintiff has failed to raise any substantial federal question, and this appeal should therefore be dismissed and the judgment of the state supreme court affirmed.

3. This court has already determined that there is no substantial federal question involved such that it should acquire jurisdiction to review the decision below.

As stated above, the identical Indiana Supreme Court decision, *State of Indiana v. Baysinger, et al.*, — Ind. —, 397 N.E.2d 580 was the subject of the appeal in *Clark v. Indiana,* No. 79-1325. This Court dismissed that appeal, holding that it did not present a substantial Federal question. (Memorandum opinion of May 12, 1980.) It follows that the State decision rested sufficiently on state grounds.

The May 12, 1980 order of this Court should be dispositive of the question whether the Indiana decision is appealable to this court, and judicial consistency would seem to require a dismissal of this second attack on the same decision.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Appellees respectfully move the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court.

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APPENDIX A

ORDER LIST

MONDAY, MAY 12, 1980

APPEALS—SUMMARY DISPOSITION

* * * *

79-1325 *Clark, Sue v. Indiana and Lake County Prosecutor*

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.

* * * *